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They Started With A 
Temple:JAHDS in Thailand 
The Japanese Alliance for Humanitarian Demining Support (JAHDS), 
better known for its research and development of Ground Penetrating 
Radar (Mine Eye), recently became involved in mine clearance. In the 
process of testing mine clearance equipment, JAHDS cleared an area 
around an ancient Khmer temple. 
by Paddy Blagden, Former 
T,rltnirnl n;rector f t:lrHD 
JAHDS is better known for research 
and development of Mine Eye and for 
supporting the demining efforts of other 
organizations, rather than for mine 
clearance. The need to test Mine Eye under 
operational co ndi tions call ed for the 
creation of a test field with access to 
live mines. It follows that if you have a 
field with live mines, you might as well 
clear them. 
The decision to step into the mine 
clearance arena was not taken ligh tly. 
JAHDS had been resting equipment in 
T hailand for some rime, with rhe full 
co-operation of the Thailand Mine Action 
Centre (TMAC). It had also formed a 
working relationship with the General 
Chanichai C hoonhavan Foundation 
(GCCF), a Thai NGO based in Bangkok, 
and the Thai Army, which had a Humani-
tarian Mine Act ion Unit (HMAU) 
working in the nort heast o f the 
country. JAHDS appointed Mr. 
Miss Thailand Wataru Sugaya, an ex-master-mariner, as 
competitors visiting the project manager. JAHDS also needed 
demining site. C/0 · · 1 · 1· ·d h 
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field operational skills. They chose a South 
African , Johan Van Zyl , to be th e 
Operations Manager. Zyl is a man of 
vast experience wh o is well known 
in the mine clearance world. They 
were ready to begin. 
Obviously, you cannot start 
demining without a minefield. The project 
chosen was the area around the ancient 
Khmer temple ofSadok Kok Thorn, close 
to the Thai-Cambodia border, north of 
the small border town of Aranyaprathet 
in Sakaeo Province. This temple is one 
of a network of Khmer temples, built 
about 1100 years ago, with the famous 
Cambodian temple complex of Angkor 
War as irs centre. The Khmer Rouge, and 
other warring factions, may have mined 
the remple grounds as pan of the border 
minefields. Clearance of the tem pie itself 
was needed to permit the promotion of 
increased tourism in the area and to 
provide access to land for local farming. 
The site was relatively small--about 
340 ,000 sq uare metres in all--but 
presented a range of problems, with 
vegetation varying from a flat grassy area 
to densely vegetated sections with large 
trees. The area was seen as a good site to 
build up experience. Thus,JAHDS started 
with a temple. 
Starting from nothing is difficult and 
demands patience, determination and 
good planning. T he JAHDS ream started 
by setting up a working partnership wirh 
HMAU 1 and began the refresher training 
of rhe GCCF deminers. The area chosen 
was perfect for such rraining~a low-threat 
area, with medium vegetation, but well 
suited to a systems approach, using 
machines, manual clearance and dogs. 
As confidence and experience increased, 
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more GCCF deminers were recruited, and 
HMAU 1 was able to loan a BDM48 
brush cutter and dog teams, and to carry 
out some of rhe Quality Assurance. They 
also allowed JAHDS to use a Tempest Mk 
4 and a Pearson SDTT (Survivable 
Demining Tractor and Tools), a highly 
versatile and effective machine. A JAHDS-
owned Hitachi brush cutter augmented 
rhese machines. 
Thanks to the help of its working 
partners, the JAHDS programme is now 
going well, and the first sections of land 
have been formally handed back to the 
D istr ict, and a re eve n no w being 
cultivated. The work being done will be 
available for inspection by those attend-
ing the Fifth Meeting of States Parties 
to the Mine Ban Treaty. It appears 
JAHDS will meet irs target completion 
date of October 2003. Life has always been 
"interesting" (remember the Chinese 
curse?) and never d ull. T he site was even 
visited by beautiful contestants for rhe 
"Miss T hai land" competition. No group 
of deminers has eve r concentrated 
quite so hard. 
For the futu re, there are other 
challenges in the border area, and even 
over rhe bo rder in Cambodia, but 
JAHDS will never forget that they started 
with a temple. I 
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Explosive Remnants of War: The Negotiations Continue 
Explosive Remnants of 
War: The Negotiations Continue 
From 16- 27 June 2003, States Parties to the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons 1 (CCW) met in a Group of Governmental 
Experts (GGE) to discuss a draft proposal for an Instrument on 
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). 2 A previous article in the Journal 
of Mine Action3 outlined the background to this process, and the June 
meeting was the second to take place in 2003. This article explains 
what was discussed in June, what will happen next and some of the 
broader issues of interest to the mine action community. 
by Paul Ellis, GICHD 
Background 
The aim of the current series of 
meetings is to discuss possible measures 
that could alleviate the humanitarian 
impact of ERW. Based on earlier work, 
the ambassador from the Netherlands, 
who is responsible for coordinating work 
on ERW in the CCW, presented a paper 
as a possible basis for an instrument or 
protocol on ERW. At present, there are 
two arguments as to how work on this 
paper should progress. The majority of 
Stares Parties favour the adoption of a 
legally binding protocol. 4 However, some 
States Parties continue to oppose this 
view, favouring a "statement of best 
practices." For the clearance community, 
the encouraging news is that issues that 
are central to their work in the field (such 
as responsibility for clearing up ERW and 
measures to protect civilians, e.g ., 
fencing and marking) are being d iscussed 
in an international forum. These 
discussions may result in formal obligations 
for parries to future conflicts to provide 
clearance and other mine action activities. 
After two weeks of discussions, the 
Coordinator for ERW will now redraft 
the proposal and present it again to 
States Parties in the autumn with the 
next form al meeting sch eduled for 
November 2003. The key articles of interest 
to the clearance community are Article 3: 
C learance, Removal and D estruction of 
Explosive Remnams of War; Article 4: 
Recording and Use of Information ; 
Article 5: Provisions for rhe Protection of 
the C ivilian Populations from the Effects 
of Explosive Remnams ofWar; Article 7: 
Existing Explosive Remnants of War; 
and the Technical Annex, which covers 
recording and provision of information 
on UXO and abandoned ordnance, 
plus risk education and the provision 
of information. 5 
he Draft for an 
nstrument on ERW 
From a positive perspective, the draft 
paper offers the prospect of recognizing 
the responsibility of parties to a confl ict 
to clean up ERW, which could mean 
better funding provision, swifter action 
to d eal with ERW and improved co-
operation between military fo rces 
and humanitarian organisation s. Also, 
information would be made available, 
such as the types of ordnance used, 
location of battle areas, meth ods for 
safe disposal, presence of ami-handling 
devices, and location and amounts of 
abandoned ammu niti o n. All this 
information would be of considerable use 
for pre-deploym ent planni n g and 
preparation for a pose-conflict environ-
ment. However, rhe proposals could see 
sta tes increasingly usi ng their own 
assets (almost certainly the military) 
to undertake work previously done by 
the clearance co mmunity. This raises 
issues about the quality and efficacy 
of the military in this type of work. 
Furthermore, if states use their own assets 
to clear ERW or provide risk education, 
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they might have to pay a third parry to 
do what they see as a duplication of work. 
As a result, there could potentially be a 
negative impact on funding. 
Before there will be any agreement, 
there are a number of obstacles that we 
need to overcome. Firs t , among 
many delegations, there is still a lack 
of understanding about the reality of 
work in the field o r what is invol ved 
in providing risk ed ucat ion. T he few 
"experts" that states bring along are 
almost always military officers, and 
not always with experience in explosive 
ordnance disp osal (EOD), let alone a 
mine action programme. Several states 
are openly opposed to providing any 
information beyond the bare minimum. 
The usual reason cited for this is national 
security. The GICHD and others have 
pointed out that the issue is not one of 
providing the information bur rather of 
when the information becomes known. 
A good example would be, should states 
refuse to provide coordinates for cluster 
bomb strikes, it just means that the 
clearance comm unity would have to 
establish the location us ing a survey. 
The information ultimately becomes 
known~ir just rakes longer and costs 
more. There are also grounds for concern 
about how information would be provided. 
The draft proposal mentioned international 
databases, perhaps run by the United 
Discussions include 
the provision of 
information on the 
location and types of 
abandoned ordnance. 
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Locating dangerous 
areas would become 
easier should State s 
agree to provide 
details of battle areas. 
Nations, yet such databases do not exist. 
In pan, the problem for many states 
appears to be a reluctance to provide 
information, perhaps because they perceive 
this as a loss of control. 
n.e GICHD's Role 
The GICHD will continue to play 
an active role in n ego tiations . Two 
recently published reports on infor-
m a tion requ irements and warnings 
and risk education6 were written to try 
to provide delega tes to the m ee tings 
with a better understanding of the 
issues involved . The Centre's mandate 
is to provide technical advice to the States 
Parties involved in the discussions. Areas 
we will be concentrating on in the second *ALl graphics courtesy of the authot: 
half of the year include seeking to 
underline the importance of providing eferences 
information that is as broad and detailed 
as possible, giv ing examples from the 
field to explain the reali ty of clearance and 
risk education work, and explaining the 
strengths of the clearance community. 
(;onclusion 
T he next meeting of the GGE on 
ERW is 17- 24 November 2003. Shortly 
after, there will be a meeting of States 
Parries to the CCW, on 27-28 November, 
ro consider the next step on this issue. 
While it is uncl ear what the States 
Parties will d ecid e, there a re two 
probable outcomes: an agreement to 
create a legally binding protocol or a 
non-legally binding "statement of bes t 
practice" for ERW Discussions on ERW 
continue, possibly because the States 
Parties cannot decide on the legal status 
of the proposal or due to the demands 
in any paper being unacceptable to some 
States Parties. Perhaps the greates t 
danger is a legally binding docu ment 
that has been so weakened to achieve 
agreemen t that it does li t tl e if any-
thing to allevia te the acknowledged 
humanita ri an impact of ERW. • 
J . The full official ririe of the CCW is: The 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on rhe 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May 
e Deemed 10 be Excessively Injurious or ro have 
lndiscriminare Effects." 
2. Unired Nations, Draft Proposal for an in· 
strument on Explosive Remnants ofWm; Coordina· 
tor on Explosive Remnants ofWar, Working Group 
on Explosive Remnants of War, CCW/GGE/V/ 
WG. l /WP 1/Rev. l 20 May 2003, Geneva. 
3. Ell is, op cit. 
4. Should a legall y binding protocol be 
adopred it would become rhe fifrh protocol of the 
CCW. For derails of the other four protocols, see 
Ellis, op cit. 
5. Full derails of rhe Drafr Proposal and other 
papers presen ted to rhc meeting in June can be 
found on the UN Departmenr of Disarmament 
Affairs websi te on the CCW ar hrrp:// 
disarmamenr.un.org/ccw/i ndex.h rml. 
6 Explosive Rem nants ofWar~lnformntion 
Requirements, G lCHD, Geneva, 2003 and Explo· 
sive Remna11ts of War~ Warnings rmd Risk F:duca· 
tion,~GlCHD, Geneva, 200.3. 
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ITEP Work Plan, continued from page 97 
Service (UNMAS) and Geneva International 
Centre for Humanita ri an D em ining 
(GICHD). ITEP participants are 
encouraged to reach out into the user 
co mmunity to seek fe edback on the 
ITEP Work Plan and, together with 
other stakeholders, to identify user needs 
in order to update and adapt the T&E 
projects accordingly. The ITEP Work 
Plan is available through the ITEP 
website (http: //www.irep.ws/) . Irs 
distribution is also being facilitated 
by UNMAS and GICHD. 
TTEP recognises the fact that a 
considerable amount ofT&E has been 
and i s being co nducted by many 
other organizatio n s in rhe fiel d of 
humanitari an demining . The hopes 
and ex p ectations are that members of 
the demining community will consult the 
Work Plan, identify re levant T &E 
activities, requesr more information 
and possibly actively collaborate in them. • 
*ALl graphics courtesy of the author. 
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Logistics-Explosives-safety 
logistics-Explosives-Safety 
Cost, safety, and compliance with international regulations are among 
the most important factors with respect to shipping explosives. The 
following article gives detailed insight into the transport and storage of 
explosives necessary for destroying mines and UXO. 
by Rolf Oechslin, RUAG 
Munition and Jorgen 
Schneider, Dyno Nobel 
Donmark A/S 
Introduction 
The humanitarian disaster caused by 
landmines and UXO littered throughout 
more than GO countries has created an 
active and growing response from the 
internationa l co mmunity that could 
evemually lead to the elimination of the 
use of landmines. As mines can be very 
dangerous or impossible to render safe, 
they often must be destroyed in-situ. 
Quality demolition products are essential 
for the safety of the mine clearance experrs. 
Del ivering materials for the dernining 
teams can be solved with reasonable 
economic resources and within a relatively 
short time; however, problems associated 
with explosives mu st be solved first. 
For example: 
• Can explos ives suitab le for 
demining be delivered locally? 
• Can explosives be transported ro 
the site and stored safely? 
• Is it possible to get explosives from 
neighbouring countries? 
• Can explosives be delivered from 
other countries? 
• W hat type of explosives should be 
delivered? 
Many traditional safety precautions 
and procedures for destroying mines and 
UXO are still being used. The following 
section includes a short discussion of the 
difficulties of rransporring explosives and 
a proposal for simplifying procedures for 
destroying or rendering safe mines and 
UXO that can easily be delivered. 
ronsport of Explosives 
To understand the transport of 
explos ives, a few things must be clear. 
First, ex pl osives a re class ified as 
d angerous goods . T h e dangerous 
goods covered by the heading of a 
cl ass are defined on the basis of their 
properties. The assignment of Class 1 
explosive substances and a rt icles has 
been ass ign ed ro a division and a 
compatibility group. The division is 
based on the results of the tests described 
in UN regulations. Listed below are the 
various divisions and compatibi li ty 
groups into which Class 1 explosive 
substances and articles are subdivid ed. 
Compatibility Definition of Compatibility Croup 
Gro~ 
13 Aniclc containing a ptimary c:~.plos i 1 ·c subsl<lncc and not having two or more 
ciTccti vc protccti 1·c features. Some articles, such a~ detonators for blasting, 
detonator asse mblies rur blasting and cap· I~ pc primers, are include d. even 
th ou<> h they do not contain primary cxplosi1·cs. 
D Sccondar} dc tonatmg c),.plosi1 c substance or black powder or article 
contai ning a secondary detonating explosi1·e substance. In each case, without 
means or initiation and without a propell ing cha rge, or an article contmning a 
primary c-..plosi, ·c substa nce and ha1 ·ing tll'o or more crrcctivc pro tccti 1·c 
features. 
-- -
s Substance or article so packed or designed that any hanrdo us cffccto; arisi ng 
from acctdcntal functioning arc confined wi thin the package unless the 
package has been degraded by fire, in which case all blast or projection effects 
are htmted to the c.\tentth a t they do not significantly htnder or prc1·cnt fire· 
fighting o r other emergency response efforts in the immediate 1·icinity of the 
·-
package. 
Table 1: Classification of compatibi lity groups. 
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Class 1: Explosive Substances 
and Articles 
Division numbers give information 
on how the explosives can be transported. 
Explosives typical for dem ining can be 
pur into one of the following divisions: 
• Division 1.1: Substan ces and 
articles that have a mass explosion hazard 
(a mass explosion is an explosion that 
affects almost the entire load instan-
taneously) . 
• Division 1.4: Substances and 
articles that present only a slight risk 
of explosion in the event of ignition or 
initiation during carriage. The effects are 
largely confined to the package and no 
projection of fragments of appreciable 
size or range is to be expected. An external 
fire shall not cause an instantaneous 
explo sion of the entire contents of 
the package. 
Compatibility Groups 
Compatibility groups inform you 
about how to stuff a container and how 
it can be transported as well. Definitions 
of compatibility groups of substances 
and articles for demining are listed in 
Table l to the top right. 
When stuffing a container with 
explosives, you are allowed ro have normal 
goods in the container as well, bur under 
no circumstances can it contain other 
dangerous goods. Table 2 shows what is 
possible ro mix when stuffing a container. 
By putting division number and 
co mpatibi li ty group together, it is 
possible to stow and transport the 
explosives by sea or air in accordance wi rh 
International Maritime Organizatio n 
(IMO) regulations (transporting by ship) 
or in accordance with the International 
Air Tra nsport Association (lATA) 
dangerous goods regulation (transporting 
by air) as in Table 3. 
Table 3 is rather theoretically and can 
be difficult to understand. All explosives 
will be listed as Class 1. In addition, they 
will have a division number, a compat-
ibility number, a UN number and a 
proper shipping name. Typical explosives 
fo r demining can be as Table 4 depicts. 
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